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Abstract 
The international political economy literature often expects that states end up in 
regulatory races to the bottom while competing for the most mobile segments of 
capital. While multilateralism argues that states are able to overcome prisoner di-
lemma situations by converging on international standards of regulation, com-
parative historical institutionalists assume ongoing diversity of regulatory frame-
works. The paper shows that reforms of banking regulation in the U.S., Britain 
and in Germany exemplify a pattern of “convergence within national diversity.” 
It is argued that a combination of comparative institutionalism with a multilat-
eral perspective allows researchers to capture the causes and patterns of regula-
tory reform in finance. While convergence on a certain “hegemonic regulatory 
model” is due to intergovernmental coordination at the regime level, national 
diversity with respect to timing and extent of regulatory change depends to a 
large extent on the existence or absence of institutional veto points in the domes-
tic political system. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In der internationalen politischen Ökonomie wurde von einigen Autoren die 
These vertreten, dass sich Nationalstaaten im Wettbewerb um das mobile Kapital 
in eine Abwärtsspirale bewegen, die zu niedrigeren regulativen Standards führt. 
Multilaterale Ansätze hingegen betonen, dass Staaten solche Prisoner-Dilemma-
Situationen durch Harmonisierung und Konvergenz auf internationale Regulie-
rungsstandards überwinden können, während die Perspektive des vergleichen-
den historischen Institutionalismus wiederum von stabiler Diversität nationaler 
Regulierungsmodelle ausgeht. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass Reformen der 
Bankenregulierung in den Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritannien und Deutschland 
zur „Konvergenz innerhalb nationaler Vielfalt“ führten. Es wird argumentiert, 
dass die Ursachen und Muster regulativer Reformen im Finanzsektor am besten 
durch eine Verknüpfung von multilateraler Perspektive mit dem historischen In-
stitutionalismus zu erklären sind. Während Konvergenz in Richtung auf ein „he-
gemoniales Regulierungsmodell“ Ergebnis intergouvernementaler Verhandlun-
gen auf Regimeebene ist, hängen nationale Unterschiede in Bezug auf den Ab-
lauf und die Reichweite regulativen Wandels zum großen Teil vom Vorhanden-
sein institutioneller Vetopunkte im nationalen politischen System ab. 
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1 Introduction 
While globalization has increased the cross-border spread of financial risks, the 
capacity of nation-states to cope with these risks seems to have decreased sub-
stantially. Some authors within the international political economy literature 
(McKenzie/Lee 1991; Rodrik 1997; Strange 1986, 1996, 1998; Greider 1997) con-
tend that states lose control of policy instruments which would impose binding 
rules on their market constituencies. Market actors may use their opportunities 
for broadening their sphere of activity to circumvent public policies that would 
impose regulatory costs on them. European banks, for instance, used their exit 
options in the early 1970s to evade the creation of expensive capital reserves as 
risk buffers, by building credit pyramids in less regulated markets abroad (OECD 
1983: 109). A pessimistic scenario suggests that states, while competing for the 
most mobile segments of capital, lower their standards of safety regulation and 
end up in “regulatory races to the bottom.” 
Against this pessimistic view, two other academic perspectives stress that pris-
oner dilemmas can be overcome. Multilateralism and the regime approach (Ruggie 
1993; Krasner 1983) argue that states can reduce the exit options of market players 
by engaging in multilateral cooperation at the European or global level. If states 
agree upon standards of regulation with which their market constituencies com-
ply, regime competition can be overcome. In finance, rules providing for the 
safety and soundness of financial transactions are in fact increasingly formulated 
in European or global arenas by nation-states in bi- and multilateral negotiations. 
While the European Union’s Single Market Program has been the most prominent 
example of European efforts at regulatory harmonization, international regimes 
such as the Basel Committee in banking (see Kapstein 1996) play crucial roles in 
harmonizing regulatory frameworks at the global level. 
Comparative historical institutionalists (Thelen/Steinmo 1992; Pierson 1994) em-
phasize the institutional embeddedness of domestic political economies. State 
and society structures, patterns of interest intermediation, law systems and cul-
tures of regulation shape the responses of political and economic actors to global 
market pressures. By providing actors with restrictions and opportunity struc-
                                                   
The paper summarizes the findings of a broader research project on “Globalization and 
the transformation of models of banking and capital market regulation in Germany, Brit-
ain and the U.S.” The project was conducted at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of 
Societies in Cologne, Germany. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the An-
nual meeting of the British International Studies Association in London, December 16–18, 
2002, and at the FISC meeting at CEPREMAP in Paris, May 23–24, 2003. I am grateful to 
the participants of the discussion, to Phil Cerny, Jürgen Feick and Cornelia Woll, and to 
the reviewers of JPP for their helpful comments. 
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tures, institutions create certain historical paths which are not easy to leave. 
Therefore, neither “races to the bottom” nor “races to the top” will ever actually 
happen. In this view, it seems highly unlikely that countries will ever converge 
on a single model of financial regulation. Several comparative studies have in fact 
shown that regulatory reforms in the financial sector were to a large extent 
shaped by domestic institutions, such as styles of state intervention in the econ-
omy (Loriaux 1997), turf battles between different administrative departments 
and their market constituencies (Rosenbluth 1989) or the (fragmented or unitary) 
structure of the policy arena in which issues of regulatory reform were decided 
(Reinicke 1995). Countries are seen to have combined measures of deregulation 
and re-regulation in ways which allowed them to play the global market game 
with national rules (S. Vogel 1996, 1997). 
I will argue in this paper that combining comparative institutionalism with a 
multilateral perspective allows us to capture the causes and patterns of regula-
tory reform in finance. Evidence is drawn from the historical development and 
transformation of banking regulation (from the 1960s to 2002) in the United 
States, Britain and Germany. In all of these countries, financial regulation is his-
torically developed and strongly embedded in federalist or unitary state struc-
tures, patterns of state–society relations or legal traditions. This is why we would 
expect a persistence of domestic regulatory institutions and “path dependent” 
patterns of regulatory reform. On the other hand, the U.S. and Britain are finan-
cial markets of some considerable size with a substantial degree of internationali-
zation. For this reason we would expect these countries to be “first movers” 
should global convergence on certain regulatory standards take place. 
I will show in this paper that the dynamics of regulatory reform in finance exem-
plify a pattern of “convergence within national diversity.” The countries studied 
did not respond autonomously to the negative externalities of financial globaliza-
tion, but did in fact converge on a certain “hegemonic regulatory model” with re-
gard to instruments of regulation and patterns of standard-setting. This model 
came about by intergovernmental negotiation at the global regime level and was 
then integrated into the European and the domestic regulatory framework. Coun-
tries converged only to a minor extent on new institutional frameworks, however, 
and also differed with respect to the timing and process patterns of reform. It is 
argued that national reform capacity depended to a large extent on the existence 
or absence of institutional veto points in the domestic political system. 
The following section of this paper sketches out the institutions, instruments and 
patterns of standard-setting in banking regulation as they governed the United 
States, Britain and Germany as long as financial markets were considered to be 
more or less territorially bounded. The third section highlights the most distinc-
tive global market and political changes. Thereafter, cross-national patterns of 
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convergence and diversity are described, followed in the next section by an as-
sessment of the variables that account for reform outcomes. The last sections take 
issue with the generalizability of these findings, by comparing the case of bank-
ing regulation both with other reform efforts in finance and with regulatory re-
structuring in the European utilities sectors. 
2 The Old Model of Banking Regulation:  
Public Regulation with Many Faces 
Historically, the development of banks reflected either the need to finance public 
expenditure for war or various efforts to spur processes of monetary integration. 
Banks were in one way or the other “servants of the state.” Not surprisingly then, 
countries like the United States, Britain and Germany extended state supervision 
of banks mostly in response to financial crises. The “public character” of the 
banking business might also help to explain why institutions of banking regula-
tion were shaped by (unitary or federalist) state structures or national styles of 
state–society relations. 
In the United States, the oversight system in banking reflected the highly frag-
mented structure of the federalist American state. Banks had developed first at 
the state level, and states were in charge of issuing bank charters. The Federal 
Government became involved in banking matters when money was needed to fi-
nance the American Civil War and government bonds were to be issued in order 
to finance the public debt. With the National Bank Act of 1863, the system of dual 
banking was established. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
was set up as part of the Department of Treasury, both to license and to regulate 
national banks. Banks received bank charters and the right to issue bank notes in 
exchange for distributing government bonds. Moreover, national banks were 
asked to keep their own minimum capital levels and to report to the Comptroller 
on a regular basis (OCC 1995: 43–52). 
Efforts to create a federal central bank had failed several times in Congress. 
States, and the radical agrarian opposition in particular complained that a federal 
lender-of-last-resort would allow “Wall Street to take control of the countries’ 
credit reserves” (OCC 1995: 88). When the Federal Reserve System was finally es-
tablished in 1913, the new system was a compromise between those who feared 
too much Wall Street control and those who feared too much control from the 
Federal Government (Cerny 1994: 180). The Federal Reserve System (Fed) com-
prised of twelve regional central banks and a Washington-based Federal Reserve 
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Board. The Fed took over the task of guaranteeing the currency from the OCC, 
began to provide new Federal Reserve notes, acted as fiscal agent of the Treasury 
and as lender-of-last-resort. Moreover, the Fed became regulator of the group of 
national banks in addition to the OCC. Statutory authority for regulation now 
rested not only in both state and federal laws, but also in the hands of different 
federal regulators. 
In the wake of the Great Depression and the banking crisis of the 1930s, President 
Roosevelt was able to overcome Congressional resistance to shift further regula-
tory tasks to the federal level. As part of the Banking Act of 1935, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was founded as the third federal banking 
regulator. The FDIC was an independent regulatory agency with some oversight 
capacities and the mission of guaranteeing small deposits and undercutting the 
psychology of bank runs. Oversight functions were now carried out by three fed-
eral agencies and the states. Not surprisingly, regulations governing asset alloca-
tion, capital adequacy (solvency) and reserve deposits (liquidity) differed be-
tween the regulators, with the federal actors tending to stricter standards than the 
states. While capital adequacy regulation was important for all bank regulators, 
no fixed standards for measuring capital adequacy existed. Although this al-
lowed for the special circumstances of individual banks to be considered by bank 
examiners, it also led to inequitable treatment across banks (Deeg/Lütz 
2000: 382). Despite their overlapping regulatory spheres, regulatory competition 
among states and between the federal and state government was from now on 
mostly latent. Markets were segmented along geographical and functional lines. 
Price competition was limited primarily by interest rate regulation, market entry 
was restricted by limits on interstate banking (based on the McFadden Act of 
1927), and the well-known Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 enforced a strict separation 
of commercial and investment banking activities. In general then, the U.S. bank-
ing system was comprised essentially of thousands of highly regulated local bank 
oligopolies. 
As in the United States, the British banking market was highly segmented. Unlike 
in the U.S., this pattern of segmentation had evolved over time and had never 
been enshrined in law. Different types of banks (clearing banks, accepting houses, 
discount houses and building societies) were specialized in different segments of 
the banking business. The different banking groups operated cartels under the 
supervision of the Bank of England (BoE). Statutory regulation played a relatively 
minor role in the prudential control of banks. The Bank of England continued the 
long-standing tradition of exercising a light supervisory touch, its only threat be-
ing expulsion from any of the various banking associations. When the central 
bank was nationalized in 1946, the new Banking Act gave it the right to issue “di-
rections” to bankers thought to be in need of corrective action. In practice, how-
Lütz: Convergence within National Diversity 9 
ever, informal guidance or “moral suasion” from the Bank of England sufficed. 
Section 123 of the Companies Act of 1967 conferred a form of privileged status 
upon certain banking institutions. Certificates were granted to those deemed to 
be carrying on the business of banking in a bona fide manner. The practical effect 
was to establish a status ladder which could be climbed by banks as their reputa-
tion grew and their expertise developed. This resulted in the adoption of a per-
verse policy whereby those having achieved the highest recognition (like the 
clearing banks or the accepting houses) received the closest attention. Accord-
ingly, many small and less well-known intermediaries escaped the Bank of Eng-
land’s supervisory net almost entirely (Hall 1999: 4; Coleman 1996: 177). The Bank 
developed clientelistic relationships with the senior management of the clearers 
that were at the top of the status ladder. Mutual understanding between the top 
management of the city banks and board members of the Bank of England was 
enhanced by common class and public school background. The highly flexible 
and informal style of regulation which is considered characteristic of the British 
regulatory culture (see D. Vogel 1986) left the Bank with plenty of scope in the in-
terpretation and implementation of the legislative provisions. Supervision cen-
tered on the management interview and prudential requirements were tailored to 
the need of individual banks. The Bank of England negotiated individual capital 
buffers with a handful of privileged banks (Hall 1999: 5) Cartels and monetary 
controls contributed to the limitation of banking risk. In the case of a politically 
damaging bank collapse, the BoE was ready to step in as lender-of-last-resort and 
would organize a “lifeboat action” together with major banks and creditors (Hall 
1993: 39). 
In Germany, banking regulation was characterized by a corporatist pattern of 
standard-setting practiced by a federal regulatory agency and peak associations 
of the main banking groups. Private commercial banks, public savings banks and 
private cooperative banks attempted to compete with each other in what is 
known as “group competition” (Gruppenwettbewerb) (about which, see Deeg 
1999: 19–20). Group competition signifies the fact that savings and cooperative 
banks do not compete individually, but collaborate with each other in their own 
group. Furthermore, these banks are organized in formal associations that were 
established around the mid-19th century. Historically, the associations of the sav-
ings banks and credit cooperatives organized cross-subsidies and rescue opera-
tions, functioned as accountants for their member banks, and ran some basic form 
of deposit insurance. Moreover, the associations acted as “private interest gov-
ernments” (Streeck/Schmitter 1985) – membership was compulsory and the as-
sociations’ accounting tasks were guaranteed by public law (see Lukas 1972: 20–
26; Linder 1968: 31; Schmidt 1990: 46; 119). 
10 MPIfG Discussion Paper 03/7 
In the wake of the banking crisis of the 1930s, the federal government initiated the 
first arrangements for federal banking regulation and supervision. The German 
Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, KWG) of December 1934 introduced norms of 
prudential regulation, some of which are still in place today (Bähre 1981). The 
main banking associations ran the central credit market committee (Zentraler 
Kreditausschuss, ZKA) as a coordination platform and interest rate cartel. After the 
Second World War, the ZKA became the place for the different banking associa-
tions to agree upon standards of capital adequacy and liquidity before these were 
discussed with the federal regulators. The ZKA enjoyed a public status since the 
German Banking Act allows the associations to be heard when standards of capi-
tal adequacy and liquidity are to be revised (see Linder 1968: 113). Since 1961 re-
sponsibility for banking supervision has been shared by the central bank 
(Deutsche Bundesbank) and a new federal banking supervisory office (Bundesauf-
sichtsamt für das Kreditwesen, BAKred), which is a higher federal agency under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Levels of capital adequacy and li-
quidity were negotiated by the BAKred and the peak banking associations, while 
the monitoring and enforcement of these standards was to a large extent dele-
gated to the associations. The state, for its part, practiced a legalized and basically 
off-site style of regulation, which did not involve it interacting with individual 
banks in the daily regulatory business. On the other hand, the corporatist model 
of regulation allowed for the equal treatment of all banks and for low transaction 
costs since the federal agency had no need for an administrative substructure of 
its own (Lütz 2002: 128). 
Taken together, patterns of standard-setting and techniques of regulation differed 
among Western countries. In the fragmented system of American federalism, 
capital buffers for risk protection depended on the policy of the respective regula-
tor. In Britain, a pattern of highly individualized rule-making prevailed, while in 
Germany a corporatist mode of regulation led to uniform standards of capital 
adequacy covering the whole German banking market of about 3,000 banks. 
3 A New Framework – Globalization of Markets and of Rule-Making 
The 1980s are considered to be the decade in which financial markets entered the 
phase of actual globalization. The development toward expanding the territorial 
scope of financial activity began in the 1960s, but intensified in the mid-1970s af-
ter the collapse of the Bretton Woods System. Domestic governments retracted 
exchange controls, dissolved former price and interest rate cartels, lowered access 
barriers for foreigners to banking activities and stock exchange membership, and 
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allowed financial innovations to be traded. Moreover, advances in computer 
technology allowed arbitrage opportunities to be exploited on a worldwide scale. 
By the early 1980s, cross-border flows of capital had reached enormous volumes, 
and the issuance and trading of securities on international markets burgeoned. 
This territorial expansion of economic activity was accompanied by the emer-
gence of an increasingly dense network of interstate collaboration in matters of 
financial regulation. Both the EU‘s Single Market Programme of 1985 and the 
European Monetary Union hastened the harmonization of financial market regu-
lation considerably. Probably equally if not more important are the efforts to co-
ordinate regulatory standards at the global regime level. The Basel Committee for 
Banking Supervision, which is comprised of central bankers and regulatory agen-
cies from the Group of Ten (G10) countries and Switzerland, has to be considered 
as the dominating coordinating body on matters of risk regulation. While each 
domestic regulator still supervises its home banking market (principle of home 
Table 1  The Old Models of Banking Regulation in the United States, Britain and Germany 
 United States Britain Germany 
Model of  
regulation 
Federalist regulation  
(until 1960s) 
Clientelist regulation  
(until 1970s) 
Corporatist regulation (until 
1980s) 
Regulatory  
structure 
Decentralized Centralized Centralized 
Public actors Federal goverments and 
agencies (OCC, FDIC), in-
dependent central bank 
(Fed), state governments 
Central Bank (BoE) Federal agency (BAKred), in-
dependent central bank (and 
state governments) 
Private actors None Privileged banking 
groups 
Peak banking associations 
with public status 
Instruments of  
regulation 
Licensing 
Differentiated capital 
requirements 
Reporting duties 
Deposit insurance 
Lender-of-last-resort 
Licensing 
“Status ladder” 
Moral suasion 
Individual capital  
requirements 
Management inter-
views 
Lender-of-last-resort 
Licensing 
Reporting duties 
Banking associations as 
accountants (savings banks 
and credit cooperatives) 
Uniform capital requirements 
Minimum reserve 
Deposit insurance (in part) 
Pattern of  
standardization 
Different standards 
depending on policy of 
regulator 
Individual standards 
for privileged banks 
Uniform standards 
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country control; see Kapstein 1996), interstate collaboration has intensified over 
the last three decades. The Basel Committee issues recommendations with the 
character of “soft law.” In the European Union, however, soft law is used to turn-
ing into statutory rules since Basel’s recommendations serve as blueprints for the 
core EU directives in prudential banking supervision. Coordination efforts have 
been driven by failures of international banks and by reoccurring financial crises 
with which regulators and central banks have had to cope. Since banks have 
tended to use formerly unknown loopholes in the regulatory safety net in order 
to circumvent rules that have imposed costs on them (see, for example, the bank-
ing failures of Herstatt Bank in 1974, Franklin National Bank 1975, Banco Ambro-
siano 1982; Johnson Matthey 1984), states have had a permanent incentive to de-
prive banks of any exit options through regulatory coordination. Particularly 
those countries with a highly internationalized home banking market, such as 
Britain, or with large numbers of international banks, like the U.S., have been 
most affected by international financial crises and therefore have pushed the 
harmonization of rules actively forward. The following sections will show that 
both countries have deliberately linked efforts of domestic re-regulation with 
those at the multilateral level. 
At the end of the 1980s, the Basel Committee was able to produce a multilateral 
agreement, the Basel Accord, which established a uniform standard of capital 
adequacy, at least within the circle of the Western industrial nations, in order to 
safeguard against financial risks. In the following decade, the standardized and 
quantitative model of international banking regulation was challenged. The 
Asian crisis revealed that the debtor categories of the Basel Accord were too 
broad and no longer helped to separate the more “risky countries” from safer 
“investment havens.” In fact, the Accord imposed perverse incentives on banks 
by stimulating them to engage in short-term, but uncertain lending for reasons of 
lower capital requirements (Financial Times, 7 April 1999:7). Thus, governments 
felt a need to look for “safer” standards of capital adequacy; however, this task 
was too great to handle without help from the banks because states alone could 
not (and still cannot) generate the degree of technical knowledge required. More-
over, American investment banks such as JPMorgan and Chase Manhattan urged 
the American representatives in the Basel Committee to push for a more flexible 
way to calculate risks and underlying capital reserves. Both of these banks had 
long been active in the securities trade and had developed considerable expertise 
with regard to internal systems of risk management (Hartmann 1996; interviews 
with members of the Basel Committee, 970620; 970522; 970617). Therefore, they 
expected to enjoy a competitive edge internationally if a more flexible model of 
international banking regulation was quickly introduced. 
The new regulatory framework (Basel II), which is supposed to finally replace the 
former Accord in 2006 after a broad consultation and test phase, consists of quan-
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titative as well as qualitative regulatory pillars (Basel Committee 1999, 2001). As 
regards the quantitative part, the new approach aims to better align capital 
charges to underlying risks by allowing banks to differentiate risk weightings ac-
cording to the assessments of rating agencies or their own ratings. Countries 
without a rating tradition like Germany feared when the new framework was 
proposed that they would run short of credit money if banks held back higher 
portions of their own capital for credit to non-rated firms, as was originally sug-
gested by the U.S.. Against this background, it was seen as a success of the Ger-
man negotiators that the Committee finally decided to allow banks to make use of 
their own rating judgments in order to calculate the size of the capital cushions 
(Basel Committee 2001). With regard to the qualitative part, permanent oversight 
by the domestic regulatory bodies, now known as the “supervisory review proc-
ess,” will become the second pillar of the new framework. Governmental authori-
ties act as “technical inspectors” that periodically test the forecast power of the 
banks’ risk assessments based on ratings or their own mathematical models. 
Should such “backtesting” continue to reveal a poor ability of the bank to forecast 
risk, a penalty is placed on the way in which the bank’s own model is rejected or 
the bank is required to hold capital in excess of minimum regulatory capital ra-
tios. Taken together, the new regulatory approach of mixed regulation requires 
regulators and individual banks to interact closely on issues of risk management. 
As we will see in the following section, countries were facing different challenges 
to adapt to the changing market and regulatory environment. 
4 Towards a New Regulatory Model: From Public to Mixed Regulation 
In all of our three countries, domestic re-regulation was shaped by the outcome of 
multilateral collaboration. Countries differed, however, with regard to the type of 
regulatory challenge they were facing and also with respect to the timing and the 
process patterns of reform. Depending on the structure and size of the domestic 
banking markets, as well as on the regulatory structures and patterns of stan-
dardization, the countries’ point of departure for regulatory reform was different. 
The American system of fragmented regulatory federalism was particularly chal-
lenged in the early 1980s. Pressures to tighten the net of prudential supervision 
emerged after several failures on the part of large money center banks, particu-
larly after the second oil crisis in 1979. Since deregulation of the American bank-
ing market was making only slow progress, U.S. banks used their exit options 
and engaged in the unregulated Euromarkets or became lenders to Third World 
countries. Not surprisingly, the large international banks were particularly hit by 
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the debt crisis in Latin America (1982/83) since they were creditors of Brazil, 
Mexico or Argentina, the countries with the largest debts (Reiner 1993: 15). When 
Congress decided to raise the American contribution to the IMF in order to help 
the debtor countries and thereby U.S. banks to overcome this debacle, pressures 
on the regulatory agencies rose. As yet, the different federal regulators had no in-
dustry-wide standard to measure the capital adequacy, asset quality, manage-
ment performance or liquidity of a bank. In November 1983, Congress passed the 
International Lending Supervisory Act (ILSA), which gave regulators statutory 
authority to set and enforce minimum capital adequacy standards and thereby 
forced them to standardize at least one of these indicators (Reinicke 1995: 135–
150). When the money center banks became aware that a new round of re-
regulation was to be launched, they mobilized their allies in Congress. Represen-
tatives of California and New York, states where money center banks were head-
quartered, pointed out that American banks would suffer from competitive dis-
advantages if they had to comply with stricter capital adequacy standards than 
their foreign counterparts (Reinicke 1995: 175–178). The Fed began to link efforts 
to harmonize standards of capital adequacy at home with those at the level of the 
Basel Committee. By the time the U.S. and Britain agreed on the main features of 
an international capital adequacy standard in 1987, the two largest financial mar-
kets (which were later joined by Japan) had already found a sure-fire way of 
guaranteeing an international level playing field. This “two level game” (Putnam 
1999) allowed the Fed to put pressure on the three federal regulators to agree on a 
single standard of capital adequacy and to enforce a strict implementation of this 
standard at home: when the Basel Committee published its final version of the 
Basel Accord in July 1988, the three regulatory agencies argued that a regulatory 
consensus reached by ten countries should not be questioned by a domestic lobby 
group. 
When the American banking sector entered a phase of minor consolidation in the 
mid-1990s, the federal regulators became more sensitive to the banks’ call to 
“lower the regulatory burden.” Both the OCC and the Fed developed more risk-
oriented techniques of prudential supervision, techniques which were increas-
ingly tailored to the risk portfolio of single banks. The regulators began to prac-
tice on-site inspections, established their own “risk management departments” 
and used ratings to measure the quality of the bank’s own risk management sys-
tems (Ludwig 1997: 15–16; OCC 1997). In the late 1990s, the Fed became the main 
advocate of a flexible, more risk-based model of banking regulation, both at the 
level of the Basel Committee and at home. Today, the Federal Reserve is inter-
ested in rationalizing prudential supervision since its regulatory domain is stead-
ily widening. Due to the increasing repeal of both territorial and functional mar-
ket barriers, the concentration process on the U.S. market has accelerated. While 
the smaller state banks have been absorbed by mergers, the number of financial 
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holding companies peaked at around 6,000 firms in 1998 (Fed 1998: 242). As a 
regulator of diversified financial holdings, the Fed differentiates both techniques 
and intensity of regulation according to the size and complexity of the regulated 
firms. Regulatory attention centers on the thirty largest and most complex banks, 
or LCBOs (large and complex banking organizations), since these global players 
seem to carry the largest financial risks. Banks classified as smaller and less com-
plex are supervised on a more off-site, standardized and less sophisticated basis 
(Greenspan 1999). The new approach to systematically differentiate standards of 
prudential supervision according to the size and perceived risk portfolio of banks 
tends to minimize conflicts in the fragmented system of regulators. Moreover, 
regulation becomes more demanding for regulators without becoming more ex-
pensive for global players. In fact, the new regulatory paradigm has to be seen as 
the outcome of “capture” by the regulated firms. 
Britain was affected by the negative externalities of financial globalization earlier 
than the United States. Since the beginning of the 1970s, London, as financial hub 
of the unregulated Euromarkets, faced failures on the part of secondary banks 
(like the London and County Securities), which were not covered by the domestic 
supervisory net. When difficulties escalated into a crisis which threatened to 
harm the inner circle of “fully recognized” city banks, the Bank of England 
launched a rescue operation in cooperation with the clearers. When the German 
Herstatt Bank collapsed due to heavy losses on foreign exchange speculation in 
June 1974, it became obvious that national rescue operations or regulatory meas-
ures were ineffective for dealing with cross-border crises. Unilateral measures of 
re-regulation, however, could cause competitive disadvantages, especially for a 
marketplace previously known for its “light supervisory touch.” From now on, 
the governor of the Bank of England became increasingly active both at the Euro-
pean level and in the Basel Committee in linking international attempts at re-
regulation with those on the home market and in preventing other states from 
regulating too quickly. Both the harmonization of banking law throughout the 
European Community and recurring banking failures at home paved the way for 
a more codified system of prudential supervision. The Banking Act of 1979 was in 
line with the First Banking Coordination Directive of the European Community 
(77/780/EEC). The act placed the Bank’s supervisory responsibilities over the 
banking sector on a statutory basis and introduced authorization procedures for 
all credit institutions. Despite this, the Bank operated as before and used informal 
techniques of control (Fishman 1993: 13–14; Hall 1999: 28). 
In the 1990s, both the failure of BCCI and, in particular, the debacle of the Barings 
Bank laid the ground for the restructuring of the British system of banking regu-
lation. In the case of Barings, the Bank of England failed for the first time to or-
ganize a rescue operation – neither banks nor the state were willing to spend 
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money on bailing out this bank (Financial Times of October 27, 1995: 11). The 
BoE’s oversight practices were challenged in the press, and the consulting firm of 
Arthur Andersen was asked to propose measures to improve the quality of bank-
ing supervision. The report recommended classifying banks according to their 
expected risk portfolios and focusing regulation on those institutes perceived as 
the “weakest links” in the system (The Financial Regulator 2/1996: 34–38). The 
Bank accepted these ideas, which had already been discussed in the Basel Com-
mittee in 1996, and issued a working paper to sketch out in detail the new RATE 
(Risk Assessment, Tools of supervision and Evaluation) system (BoE 1997). 
The broad restructuring of the system of banking supervision that took place in 
1997 was closely linked to the political imperatives of the Labour government. In 
May 1997, the new government introduced the “Financial Services and Markets 
Bill” in Parliament and announced its plans to completely reorganize the system 
of financial regulation. A new Financial Services Authority (FSA) was to be set up 
as a one-stop shopping regulator for all sectors of financial services. Today, the 
FSA’s statutory objectives encompass rule-making for financial services in gen-
eral, consumer protection and the fight against financial criminality. While losing 
its regulatory responsibilities, the Bank of England has been delegated the author-
ity to run a monetary committee and to set interest rates independently, albeit 
within targets fixed by the government. A Standing Committee comprising dele-
gates from the Bank, Treasury and the FSA meets on a monthly basis. The Treas-
ury consults with the FSA on any necessary legislation, and it has also to be con-
tacted if there is a perceived need for an official support operation (Hall 1999: 98). 
Although this move had been part of Labour’s election campaign, the decision 
came as a surprise to the governor of the Bank of England and indeed marked a 
power shift from the Bank to the government. Unlike former Tory governments, 
Labour has always criticized the existing system of clientelism in British financial 
regulation as inefficient and has favored more public oversight over the City. 
Moreover, finance minister Gordon Brown intended to keep the option of joining 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) open for Britain. This would have required 
an independent central bank, capable of deciding on monetary policy issues in 
collaboration with the European Central Bank (ECB) (Financial Times of August 
4, 1997: 12). 
In 1998, the British banking market was not only highly internationalized – 300 of 
400 City banks were foreign-owned – but also dominated by 40–50 financial con-
glomerates. The FSA began to focus regulatory attention on these “complex 
groups” and now runs “review teams” to evaluate the banks’ own risk calcula-
tions. The FSA appreciates that risks can be calculated either by the judgments of 
rating agencies or by the banks’ own ratings since this allows regulators to take 
better account of the “best practices” of British banks (Clementi 1999). Taken to-
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gether, this flexible and interactive style of mixed regulation is nothing new for 
British regulators, who to a large extent are used to relying on management in-
terviews and on close collaboration with single banks. On-site regulation, how-
ever, has now come to include communication between regulators and the lower 
management levels of a bank (BoE 1998: 32–33; Davies 1999). 
The German model of corporatist rule-making remained relatively untouched by 
financial globalization until the 1990s. In fact, both the Bundesbank and the Fed-
eral Ministry of Finance dealt with the failure of the German Herstatt Bank in a 
well-known, corporatist way. The central bank and the banking associations 
founded the “Liko-Bank” to provide credits to members of the associations in 
situations of insolvency. The Ministry threatened the private banking sector with 
the introduction of a statutory public deposit insurance, should the private banks 
fail to increase their contribution to the already existing deposit insurance fund of 
the association of private banks (Bundesverband der privaten Banken). A system of 
mandated deposit insurance funds, run by the three banking associations, was es-
tablished. Article 32 of the German Banking Act requires banks to become mem-
bers of a deposit insurance fund if they intend to apply for a banking license 
(Ronge 1979: 98–99). 
The move towards a greater formalization of rules, which came with the Euro-
pean banking directives, failed to affect either the structure or the style of regula-
tion, but only led to several revisions of the KWG. The development of a multi-
level system of rule-making, however, with the EU and the Basel Committee rep-
resenting core decision levels in matters of banking regulation, strengthened the 
position of the federal supervisory agency (BAKred) vis-à-vis the banking asso-
ciations. Since the smaller banks in particular rely on the help of the agency to 
take account of their interests when prudential standards are negotiated, the 
BAKred has turned into a “gatekeeper” for the upper levels of decision-making. 
The supervisor not only benefited from informational advantages, but was also 
able to control the domestic implementation of EU directives better. From time to 
time this allowed the agency to push for a tighter implementation of EU direc-
tives than required (Interviews with German banks and the BAKred, 970618, 
970424b). 
In fact, the German model of corporatist standard-setting was not questioned as 
long as international harmonization led to quantitative standards (such as the 
capital ratio) being implemented at home. The first Basel Accord proved to be 
“autonomy-safe” since national styles of regulation could be pursued in the 
shadow of a quantitative minimum norm. The new model of mixed banking 
regulation, which is supposed to replace the former Basel Accord in 2006, at-
taches greater importance to highly differentiated, as opposed to uniform, regula-
tory solutions, to qualitative regulatory measures and to cooperation between 
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public and private actors in particular. Since this requires interactivity and flexi-
bility in the daily business of regulators, it touches much more on the regulatory 
culture and puts countries under greater pressure to converge on certain “best 
practices” of regulation rather than on the previous uniform approach. For Ger-
many, “Basel II” is a break with the national tradition of treating all banks equally 
through universally applied rules and regulations, a system upheld by corporatist 
traditions of power-sharing between the federal supervisory office and the main 
three banking associations, and by a supervision scheme monopolized by law-
yers. 
Moreover, Germany has no rating tradition on which banks can rely when calcu-
lating their credit risks. In the United States, more than 8,000 firms are said to be 
rated, whereas in Germany less than 40 firms have ratings, with the small and 
medium-sized firm segment not being rated at all. While global players are will-
ing to assume the costs for the development of sophisticated models of risk man-
agement, small and medium-sized banks prefer simple and standardized tech-
niques of calculating risks in order to save on development costs. It is for this rea-
son that we are observing an increasing diversification of policy preferences within 
the domestic banking community on issues of regulation. This, however, seems to 
challenge the existing cartel of banking associations much more than it questions 
the role of the state in the model of sectoral governance. While the associations of 
savings banks and credit cooperatives are still eager to provide “club goods” (Bu-
chanan 1965) by setting up internal credit rating schemes for their members, the 
larger private banks prefer risk management techniques that are tailored to their 
individual needs (Financial Times Deutschland of December 18, 2000: 18). The 
state, for its part, now engages in closer collaboration with global players and re-
organizes the supervisory structure to keep up with the modeling and measure-
ment specialists from the banking sector. The federal banking agency has created 
a new department employing statisticians and economists who now collaborate 
with risk managers at the head offices of the major banks in Germany. The need 
to build up in-house expertise in risk management by hiring practitioners from 
industry has raised the question of a more flexible payment structure. The institu-
tional answer to this problem has been to found the BAFin (Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) as a formal umbrella regulator for banking, capital 
markets and insurance. Unlike its British counterpart, the new agency is not in-
dependent but still under the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Finance. The 
three existing sectoral oversight bodies have not yet been dissolved, but have be-
come departments of the new regulator, while the division of regulatory tasks 
among them remains untouched. Restructuring should allow for a more flexible 
payment of the agency’s staff since the supervisor’s funding is provided by the 
banks and no longer by the state (BMF 2001 and 2002). 
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5 Cross-National Patterns of Convergence and Diversity 
The comparison of our three cases indicates that there has in fact been a certain 
amount of convergence regarding the outcomes of regulatory reforms. Countries 
converged primarily on new techniques and patterns of standard-setting, but 
only converged to a minor extent on new institutional frameworks. The new 
“hegemonic regulatory model” accounts for greater interactivity between public 
regulators and global banks in the daily routine of regulation, for more qualita-
tive than quantitative ways to measure (and buffer) financial risks, and for differ-
entiated levels of capital requirements depending on the size of a bank and its 
risk portfolio. This model of regulation is probably more alien to countries like 
Table 2  The New Models of Banking Regulation in the United States, Britain and Germany 
 United States Britain Germany 
New Model of 
regulation 
Mixed regulation with state 
participation 
Mixed regulation Mixed regulation with par-
ticipation of associations 
Regulatory 
structure 
More centralized Centralized Centralized 
Public actors Federal gov. and agencies 
(OCC, FDIC), indep. cen-
tral bank (Fed), state gov. 
Independent regulatory 
agency (FSA) 
Federal agency (BAKred; 
since May 2002 BAFin); 
indep. central bank 
Private actors Global players Global players Global players 
Peak banking associations
Instruments of 
regulation 
Licensing 
Differentiated capital  
requirements 
Reporting duties 
Off-site examination 
On-site inspection 
Supervisory review 
process 
Deposit insurance 
Lender-of-last-resort 
Licensing 
Differentiated capital  
requirements 
Management interviews 
Reporting duties 
On-site inspection 
Supervisory review  
process 
Deposit insurance 
Lender-of-last-resort 
Licensing 
Differentiated capital  
requirements 
Reporting duties 
On-site inspection 
Supervisory review  
process 
Banking associations  
as accountants 
Deposit insurance 
Pattern of stan-
dardization 
Different standards 
depending on the size and 
risk portfolio of bank 
Different standards 
depending on the size and 
risk portfolio of bank 
Different standards 
depending on the size and 
risk portfolio of bank 
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Germany than it is to Britain with its highly flexible and interactive tradition of 
financial market regulation or to the U.S. whose fragmented oversight structure 
has always inhibited the development of fixed capital adequacy standards. 
We do see convergence in the institutional make-up of banking regulation to the 
extent that there has been a certain power shift towards the federal state level in 
all countries in response to globalization. In the United States, for example, the 
Federal Reserve Board has gained ground on the fragmented battlefield of feder-
alist banking regulation. In Britain, power has shifted from the Bank of England 
to the government, and to the Treasury in particular, while in Germany the posi-
tion of the federal regulator within the corporatist setting of regulation has been 
strengthened. Weight-shifting among actors, however, takes place within institu-
tional frameworks of regulation that are still diverse across countries. The Ameri-
can system of regulatory federalism remains relatively untouched by pressures to 
integrate all subsectoral regulators. In fact, it seems rather unlikely that regula-
tory agencies will ever be dissolved; strong regulators (like the Fed or the U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission as regulator of securities trading and capital 
markets) use to ally with their respective congressional oversight committees and 
also with their regulatory clienteles in order to defend their turfs. Britain and 
Germany have moved to the model of “one-stop shopping regulator,” but have 
done so within their respective administrative traditions and preexisting patterns 
of regulation. The newly founded British FSA is an independent regulatory 
agency which consults with the Treasury and the central bank on issues of legisla-
tion or possible bailouts and reports to parliament on a regular basis. Conversely, 
the German BAFin operates within the administrative hierarchy of the Ministry 
of Finance, is therefore not independent and still confers with banking associa-
tions on regulatory matters. 
It is neither obvious that the model of an integrated financial market regulator 
will become “best practice” even in Europe. So far, only Austria, Sweden and 
Denmark have followed the British model of integrated oversight; other countries 
(Belgium, Ireland and Spain) share a regulator for only two subsectors, while the 
majority of countries (France, Italy, Netherlands, Finland, Portugal, Greece and 
Luxembourg) run systems with three subsectoral regulators. 
Cross-national diversity also characterizes the timing of regulatory efforts and the 
extent of institutional change. Britain started to codify its system of prudential su-
pervision in the early 1970s and followed this by taking incremental steps to es-
tablish a model of mandated self-regulation over the capital market during the 
Thatcher era. It was not until the mid-1990s that a restructuring of the financial 
oversight system took place which, compared to what happened in the U.S. or in 
Germany, has to be seen as the most fundamental break with previous structures. 
By shifting regulatory authority from the Bank of England to an independent sec-
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toral regulator, the British government demonstrated its willingness to break 
with the clientelist and cozy relationships that obtained between regulator and 
City firms. 
The United States were much more persistent with respect to the institutional 
framework of banking regulation. Pressures to coordinate capital adequacy stan-
dards among the federal regulators rose in the 1980s, while the 1990s saw an in-
cremental development towards “risk-sensitive” instruments of prudential su-
pervision within the existing institutional setting. 
In Germany, efforts to initiate regulatory reform advanced in the 1990s, when the 
corporatist model of uniform rule-setting was challenged by the new flexible and 
interactive paradigm of risk regulation. The establishment of an integrated regu-
lator for banking, capital markets and insurance, however, seems less revolution-
ary than in Britain since the sectoral regulators have not been dissolved but only 
formally subsumed under one umbrella. 
6 Explaining the Pattern: The Interplay of International  
and National Variables 
The mixed pattern of “convergence within national diversity” which character-
izes the outcome of regulatory transformation can be traced back to the interplay 
of international and national factors which shaped the national responses to the 
negative externalities of financial globalization. The United States, Britain and 
Germany did not respond autonomously to global pressures, but coordinated 
their responses at the regime level of the Basel Committee (and also within the 
European Union) in a multilateral fashion. Coordination of national regulators 
and central bank governors was spurred on by international financial crises and 
recurring banking failures, partly induced by the banks’ efforts to exploit loop-
holes in the regulatory safety net. States or central banks were then forced to or-
ganize bailouts and to socialize the costs of privately undertaken risks. It is for 
this very reason that states were the driving forces of regulatory restructuring 
both at the international level and at home. States had an incentive to collaborate 
since unilateral measures of regulation could always be bypassed by international 
banks and were seen to cause competitive disadvantages for those who acted as 
“first movers.” Not surprisingly then, those countries which were most affected 
by financial crises or banking failures actively linked domestic re-regulation with 
coordinated action in order to reduce their adaptation costs. In the 1970s, Britain 
was a driving force of regulatory coordination at both international and European 
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level. Banking failures on the unregulated Euromarket had caused spillover ef-
fects on City banks and put pressure on the Bank of England to adjust the British 
model of “light supervision” to the new challenges. When the debt crisis of the 
early 1980s hit American banks and led to an IMF bailout, it was the U.S. who ini-
tiated a new round of regulation. The 1990s saw the move towards a more flexi-
ble model of banking regulation, partly as response to the pressure of U.S. in-
vestment banks, which had already developed considerable expertise with flexi-
ble techniques of risk management, and partly as an answer to the Asian crisis 
and to the apparent deficits of the old standardized approach. Germany was 
more of a rule taker than shaper on the international scene. In the 1990s, the Ger-
man negotiators in the Basel Committee actively worked on adapting the flexible 
model of banking regulation to the non-rating tradition of Continental countries 
in order to minimize any competitive disadvantages that might result from regu-
latory reform. 
All in all, the international harmonization of rules was driven by domestic regula-
tors pursuing national interests. Their role as “gatekeeper” to the upper levels of 
rule-making, however, strengthened national regulators vis-à-vis their domestic 
constituencies and helped them to overcome resistance to reforms at home. The 
Fed in particular made use of this strategic position as intermediary to put pres-
sure both on other federal regulators and on money center banks to agree on a 
single standard of capital adequacy. The German federal supervisory agency, for 
its part, used its gatekeeper relation to the EU and the Basel Committee from time 
to time to push for a tighter implementation of EU directives than was required. 
Linkages with international games, however, did not completely shape the pat-
terns and outcomes of domestic reform. Countries had different starting points 
for regulatory reform, different challenges to cope with and different conflicts to 
solve in order to transplant the “hegemonic regulatory model” into their respec-
tive domestic frameworks. Some countries like Britain restructured earlier and 
more fundamentally than the U.S. or Germany. It is here where the diversity of 
domestic institutions comes into play – notably the role of political systems, of 
(unitary or federalist) state structures, of patterns of state–society relations and of 
the structure of national banking markets. 
Political institutions, for instance, shaped the domestic reform processes by pro-
viding reform opponents with either opportunities or obstacles to veto regulatory 
efforts. In the United States, reform opponents used the system of fragmented 
federalism in the 1980s to substantially slow down the process of harmonizing 
capital adequacy standards: states in which money center banks were residing al-
lied with their market constituencies in Congress to prevent the federal regulators 
from launching a new round of regulation. 
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In Britain, it was precisely the absence of those veto structures that allowed finan-
cial oversight competences to be transferred to a new independent regulatory 
agency. This comparatively high reform capacity was due to the political impera-
tives of the Labour government. Strong political leadership in Britain is based not 
only on political ideas and programs but also, to a large extent, on a political sys-
tem that allows potential veto players only minimal access. Institutional features 
such as the system of majority voting, single party government and a unitary 
state structure strengthen the government’s capacity to act once it has decided to 
do so. 
The German political system is usually seen as providing potential veto players 
with maximal access to political decision-making. The pattern of “centralized so-
ciety and decentralized state” (Katzenstein 1987), that is, corporatism and the in-
terlocking politics of German federalism, is usually seen as inhibiting significant 
policy changes. In finance, however, it has been more in securities and capital 
markets that regulatory reform has been shaped by veto structures in general and 
by federalism in particular. In the past, the German Länder actively defended their 
formerly quite stable federalist model of horizontal power-sharing against efforts 
to centralize sectoral oversight authority at the federal level. Turf battles between 
the Federal Ministry and the states halted the process of regulatory centralization 
for a while since the Länder were able to use their codecision rights in the upper 
federal chamber (Bundesrat) to veto pending federal legislation aimed at creating 
a federal supervisory body (Lütz 1998; Deeg/Lütz 2000). In banking, however, 
corporatism did not play out as a veto structure, partly because of the growing 
diversification of policy preferences among the banking associations and partly 
because there was no need to impede the implementation of the flexible approach 
since risk management instruments could now be tailored to the needs of differ-
ent banking groups. In fact, today the corporatist implementation structure itself 
is transforming, although not completely eroding. Closer collaboration between 
public regulators and global banks on issues of risk management coexists with 
associational governance when it comes to setting up internal rating schemes for 
the small and medium-sized segment of banks. Corporatism obviously allows for 
the implementation of a greater variety of regulatory practices within the domes-
tic sphere. 
Finally, differences in the structure of national banking markets also account for 
the diversity of regulatory frameworks. Both the United States and Britain have 
seen substantial concentration processes, which provide some functional ration-
ale for further centralization of the regulatory setting. In the U.S., concentration 
has accelerated due to the increasing repeal of both territorial and functional 
market barriers. As a response to this “decompartmentalization” of the domestic 
market (Cerny 1993, 2004a), the number of federalized holding companies made 
24 MPIfG Discussion Paper 03/7 
up of partially or wholly owned subsidiaries operating in different market sectors 
has expanded – and with them the regulatory domain of the Federal Reserve 
Board (Deeg/Lütz 2000). In Britain, the emergence of large financial conglomer-
ates has provided some functional reasoning for shifting oversight duties from 
subsectoral regulators to a “one-stop shopping regulator.” In contrast to the 
United States and Britain, the German banking market is still characterized by a 
large number of small and mid-sized banks, a fact that makes the persistence of 
banking associations in the regulatory model more likely than the transfer of fur-
ther regulatory tasks to the federal supervisory agency (BAFin). As yet, concen-
tration processes have been considerably buffered by a regional public banking 
sector and by bank – company networks still based on equity ownership and on 
seats held by banks on supervisory boards (Deeg 1999; Lütz 2000). 
7 Theoretical Implications 
One lesson that we can draw from this study is that domestic responses to global-
ization go beyond the commonly stipulated alternatives of either “convergence” 
or “persistence,” by providing a mixture of both. Whether these “hybrid out-
comes” – mixes of old and new elements – will constitute new and stable institu-
tional equilibria in national regulatory frameworks or just mark a state of transi-
tion en route to further convergence (Cerny 2004b) remains an empirically open 
question. In our case, countries do converge on patterns of standardization and 
instruments of regulation while differences in the underlying institutional frame-
works of regulation prevail. Cross-national diversity also characterizes the timing 
of regulatory efforts and the extent of institutional change – with some countries 
being seen to launch reforms earlier and to restructure their regulatory frame-
work more substantially than others. 
I have explained this outcome by reference to the interplay of international and 
national levels of regulatory reform. States coordinated their responses to the 
negative externalities of financial globalization multilaterally in order to reduce 
the competitive disadvantages of being “first movers” in processes of re-regula-
tion. International games backed the efforts of those who acted as intermediaries 
to overcome domestic resistance to reform, but determined neither the process 
patterns nor the extent of regulatory change. Domestic institutional variables help 
to fill this explanatory gap: while political institutions shaped domestic reform 
processes by providing reform opponents either with opportunities or with re-
strictions to veto regulatory efforts, differences in the structure of national bank-
ing markets help to account for the ongoing diversity of regulatory frameworks. 
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The findings of this study suggest that the adequate “toolkit” for research on 
globalization effects crosses the disciplinary divide of either an “international re-
lations” or a “comparative institutionalist” framework, but requires a systematic 
linkage of both. 
A crucial issue for further globalization studies is whether the theoretical frame-
work presented here has any validity beyond the case of regulatory reform in 
banking. To what extent can we generalize from our case study? I first discuss 
this point within the sector of finance, comparing the case of banking regulation 
with reforms of stock exchange regulation and with recent transformations of 
corporate governance systems in Europe. I then turn to the cross-sectoral perspec-
tive and locate my findings within the debate on the “new regulatory state in 
Europe.”1 
The mixed pattern of “convergence within diversity” that characterizes the out-
comes of regulatory reform in banking differs not only from securities regulation, 
where we observe an even higher degree of convergence, but also from corporate 
governance reforms in Europe, which have produced quite diverse outcomes. Re-
forms of stock exchange regulation in the United States, Britain and Germany 
have paved the way for convergence on common philosophies and instruments 
of regulation, which emphasize the investors’ rights of information and transpar-
ency on market transactions and the state’s task to provide legal penalties for 
non-compliance with market rules. Moreover, countries have substantially reor-
ganized their institutional frameworks of regulation by replacing systems of pri-
vate self-regulation with those of public oversight (Lütz 1998, 2002). 
Conversely, patterns of corporate finance and governance in Europe are still con-
siderably diverse across nations. Deeg and Perez (2000) argue that corporate gov-
ernance reforms in Italy, Spain, France and Germany have not only broadened 
the diversity among the four cases, but also have tended to widen rather than 
narrow the gap between the Continental “insider model” of corporate govern-
ance, associated with a concentrated ownership structure, low market transpar-
ency and the absence of hostile takeovers, and the Anglo-Saxon “outsider model” 
of an equity-dominated market in corporate control. 
What accounts for the varying degree of convergence even within the financial 
sector? First, it seems to matter what kind of  “dependent variable” we are look-
ing at. The cases of capital market and banking regulation exemplify considerably 
policy-related transformations, that is, revised patterns of either rule-setting, regu-
                                                   
1 See Majone 1994; 1996; 1997, the special issues of Current Politics and Economics of 
Europe 9(4), 2000 and the special issues of the Journal of European Public Policy 9(6), 
2002. Michael Moran (2002) provides a helpful review of this discussion. 
26 MPIfG Discussion Paper 03/7 
latory instruments or regulatory institutions. Corporate governance systems, on 
the other hand, are core elements of a domestic political economy and link up closely 
with domestic market structures, with the organization of firms or with types of 
bank–firm relations. In other words, corporate governance systems are deeply 
embedded in the underlying make-up of a domestic political economy and are, 
for reasons of “institutional stickiness” and complementary linkages with other 
subsets of the political economy, probably more resistant to change.2 Michel 
Goyer, for instance, argues that cross-national differences in the pattern of change 
in corporate governance systems can also be traced back to the organization of 
the workplace, which provides management with different constraints and op-
portunities to pursue the business strategy of the firm (Goyer 2002). 
A further key to explaining varying degrees of institutional convergence, I find, is 
to know how change comes about. Domestic restructuring can be either largely 
market-driven or politically mediated. In the past, reforms of stock exchange 
regulation, for instance, were to a large extent shaped by regulatory competition 
between states which adopted the U.S. model of stock exchange regulation pri-
marily to compete more successfully for institutional investors. Thus, market 
pressures did not leave states or investment banks with much leeway to influence 
the direction of institutional change and ultimately caused a relatively high de-
gree of institutional convergence (Lütz 1998). In the case of banking, regulatory 
reform was much more politically mediated, simply because reform efforts were 
crisis-driven and reflected the interests of states and central banks in reducing 
possible competitive disadvantages through multilateral coordination. Corporate 
governance reforms in Europe exemplifies the case with the highest degree of po-
litical involvement. Especially in countries with a protective regulatory structure 
and limited market-based competition, such as Italy, Spain and France, reforms 
were advanced by public officials, very often in the face of resistance from market 
actors. Furthermore, restructuring in Europe was not driven by market pressures 
since there is no compelling relationship between a firm’s ability to raise equity 
finance and the nature of its management structure (Deeg/Perez 2000: 145). In 
Germany, reforms were highly politicized and, in contrast to other areas of fi-
nance, deeply contested between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), as discussions on company disclosure, man-
agement accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution and takeover 
regulation reveal (Höpner 2003). 
The financial sector is often considered to be unique since financial services have 
for a long time provided an infrastructure for other sectors of the political econ-
omy (Cerny 1993), even for those formerly nationalized industries, such as tele-
                                                   
2 These issues are well discussed in the institutionalist literature and in the “varieties 
of capitalism approach” (see Thelen 1999; Hall/Soskice 2001). 
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communications, electricity or railways, which have been regarded as being in-
frastructures themselves. Due to deregulation and the privatization of state in-
dustries, however, these sectors are supposed to become “commodified,” a proc-
ess that would bring market relations closer to the increasingly short-term, arm’s-
length and risk-averse relationships that have already evolved on international 
financial markets. The making of markets has been accompanied by new rules 
ending monopolies and regulating competition, and by the creation of specialized 
regulatory agencies which are seen to provide the basis for the “rise of the regula-
tory state in Europe” (Majone 1994, 1996). The crucial issue currently debated 
among Europeanists is whether or not nations have already converged on a sin-
gle European model of regulation, as the proponents of the regulatory state hy-
pothesis suggest (Majone 1997: 148). 
A brief, comparative look at the outcomes of regulatory restructuring confirms the 
mixed pattern of “convergence within diversity” that we find in the case of bank-
ing. Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), which were rare in Europe until the 
late twentieth century, emerged increasingly in the 1980s and 1990s, especially for 
utilities. IRAs were created to approve or block mergers, to issue and enforce li-
censes, and to regulate prices and market access. As non-majoritarian institutions 
specialized in regulation, the newly founded agencies shared features like low 
party politicization, separation from regulatees and relatively open decision-
making processes (Thatcher 2002b). However, IRAs have not spread evenly 
across countries and domains. Germany has fewer IRAs than Britain, which is 
probably due to the hierarchical German administrative structure and tradition 
(Czada/Lütz 2003). The behavior of IRAs differs across nations: Britain has a 
much stronger “revolving door” between agencies and the private sector than It-
aly, France and Germany, while Italy has greater party politicization of appoint-
ments to IRAs (Thatcher 2002a, 2002c). Features of regulation and the balance be-
tween generic and sector-specific rules vary across sectors. In telecommunica-
tions, we see not only a mass of re-regulatory rules covering aspects from inter-
connection to tariffs but also strong national IRAs, whereas, in electricity, regula-
tory powers are distributed between agencies, competition authorities and, in 
countries such as Austria or Germany, sector-specific industry regulators with 
powers to self-regulate ex ante the prices and conditions charged by the transmis-
sion system operators (Eberlein 2000: 415). 
As to the driving forces of regulatory restructuring, we see apparent differences in 
utilities to the situation we have found in finance. Restructuring in finance, either 
of regulatory frameworks or of corporate governance patterns, responds more or 
less to issues linked to financial globalization, that is, the rise of institutional in-
vestors, increasing capital mobility or financial crises. Domestic responses to 
these global pressures have been mediated either by market-like regulatory com-
petition between states, by politically induced multilateralism or by purely na-
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tional political strategies.3 In the utilities, however, regulatory change has mostly 
been politically mediated. It is only in telecommunications that transformation 
has also been driven by increasingly intense global competition, by technological 
possibilities and the potential profits, spurred on by U.S. deregulation in the 
1970s and early 1980s. However, EU decisions have played a crucial intermediary 
role in transmitting, channeling, and amplifying global pressures, and in structur-
ing the resulting regulatory systems of most member states (Schneider 2001; S. 
Schmidt 1998). In electricity, market pressures have not been much of a factor, 
given that there was little direct pressure from globalization in a sector with few 
technological changes and little competition in highly protected markets. Not 
surprisingly, the EU Commission was the principal instigator for reform and EU 
decision-making was crucial in persuading member states to accept changes 
which, for some, went completely against their policy legacies and preferences. 
Policy adjustment to Europeanization is shaped by the interplay of the European 
and the national level and, as Vivien Schmidt argues, strongly mediated by insti-
tutional factors (existence or absence of domestic veto points), policy legacies, 
policy preferences and discourses (V. Schmidt 2002: 899). 
8 Conclusion 
What general lessons can we learn from the cases examined here? First, the “con-
vergence within diversity” perspective covers a substantial range of reform out-
comes induced by either global or European pressures; hence both globalization 
and Europeanization studies could possibly benefit from this line of thinking. 
Second, comparative institutionalism or comparative political economy ap-
proaches seem to be crucial for the study of either globalization or Europeaniza-
tion effects, and, in all of our cases, national or sectoral institutional frameworks 
have mediated domestic responses to global or European pressures to a greater or 
lesser extent. Third, linkages of comparative approaches with either an “interna-
tional relations” or an “international political economy” framework proved to be 
helpful in explaining regulatory change induced by financial globalization: con-
vergence on certain “hegemonic regulatory models” was due to interdependent 
and not to autonomous patterns of domestic responses. The same holds basically 
true for regulatory reforms in the European utilities; here, the interaction of su-
pranational entrepreneurship or intergovernmental coordination with domestic 
action is obviously a key to explaining national adaptation processes. 
                                                   
3 The internationalization of regulatory reform and the driving forces of regulatory 
diffusion are systematically discussed in the book project of Jordana/Levi-Faur/
Vogel. See also Wilson (2003) for a discussion of the mechanisms of policy transfer in 
regulation. 
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